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PREDICATE OFFENSES, FOREIGN CONVICTIONS, 
AND TRUSTING TRIBAL COURTS 
Alexander S. Birkhold* 
Concerns about the reliability of criminal justice systems in foreign 
countries have resulted in uneven treatment of foreign convictions in U.S. 
courts.1 Federal courts, however, have historically accepted tribal court 
convictions as predicate offenses under recidivist statutes.2 But the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the uncounseled convictions 
obtained against Michael Bryant, Jr., a serial domestic abuser, in the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court.3 The court dismissed a federal indictment 
that had been brought against Bryant under 18 U.S.C § 117, which makes it a 
felony to commit domestic violence against a spouse or partner in Indian 
country if the perpetrator has at least two prior domestic abuse convictions,4 
because Bryant’s convictions did “not comport with the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.”5 
The Ninth Circuit decision jeopardizes the health and safety of Native 
American women and stymies federal efforts to prosecute domestic violence 
in Indian country. Available studies suggest domestic abuse is a grave 
concern among indigenous communities. For instance, over half of 
indigenous women respondents to a Department of Justice survey reported 
being stalked, physically assaulted, or raped during their lifetimes.6 But the 
stakes of the case also extend to the legitimacy of tribal courts. Because 
federal courts often allow the use of foreign convictions as predicate offenses 
or factor them into sentencing decisions, even where those convictions 
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 1.  See Alex Glashausser, The Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as Predicates 
for Sentence Enhancements Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE L.J. 134, 137–52 (1994). 
 2.  E.g., United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 3.  United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 690 
(2015). 
 4.  18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012). 
 5.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673. 
 6.  PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF 
THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 22–23 
(2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8PK-TRME]. 
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would have violated the U.S. Constitution if obtained domestically, the 
Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the uncounseled conviction in United States v. 
Bryant implicitly suggested that tribal courts are less reliable fora than many 
foreign courts. This year the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to 
repudiate the Ninth Circuit’s distrust of tribal court procedures and affirm 
its commitment to the integrity of tribal courts. 
I. The Ninth Circuit Rejected Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in 
United States v. Bryant 
Michael Bryant, Jr. was convicted at least six times for domestic abuse in 
the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court.7 In June 2011, Bryant was indicted by 
a federal grand jury on two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).8 Pursuant to section 117(a), a “person who 
commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian country . . . who has a final 
conviction on at least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian 
tribal court proceedings” for assault against a spouse or intimate partner 
shall be subject to fines or imprisonment.9 While prosecuting the case, the 
government relied on two of the domestic abuse convictions obtained 
against Bryant in the tribal court as the basis for the federal charges.10 
During the district court proceeding, Bryant filed a motion to dismiss 
the indictment. Because he was not represented by counsel during the tribal 
court cases, Bryant argued that using those convictions to satisfy an element 
of section 117(a) violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.11 The 
district court denied the motion and Bryant entered a guilty plea.12 He was 
subsequently sentenced to forty-six months in prison and appealed.13 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to determine 
whether the habitual offender statute, 18 U.S.C. § 117(a), violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right to due process 
by permitting the use of uncounseled tribal court convictions as the 
predicate offenses for a federal charge.14 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
disagreed with the lower court and determined the earlier convictions did 
 
 7.  Brief of Appellee United States at 2, United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 
2014) (No. 12–30177). 
 8.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 672–73. 
 9.  18 U.S.C. § 117(a). 
 10.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673. 
 11.  Id. at 673–74. 
 12.  Id. at 673. 
 13.  Id. at 673–74. 
 14.  Id. 
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not comport with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.15 Even though 
section 117 explicitly recognizes tribal court convictions, the court held 
Bryant’s convictions from the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court could not be 
the basis for the federal offense and dismissed the indictment against him.16 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision represents a disturbing departure from the 
usual treatment of tribal court convictions by its sister circuits. 
II. Other Circuit Courts Have Recognized Tribal Court Convictions When 
Faced With Nearly Identical Facts 
Other Circuit Courts of Appeals have accepted the use of uncounseled 
tribal court convictions as predicate offenses under section 117(a).17 For 
example, in United States v. Cavanaugh, the Eighth Circuit considered 
whether Roman Cavanaugh, Jr. could be indicted under section 117(a) when 
his three earlier misdemeanor abuse convictions in tribal court had been 
obtained without counsel.18 Following a district court’s dismissal of the 
indictment against Cavanaugh, the Eight Circuit was asked to determine 
“whether the Fifth or Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
preclude the use of these prior tribal-court misdemeanor convictions as 
predicate convictions to establish the habitual-offender elements of § 117.”19 
The Eighth Circuit explained that Congress “enjoys broad power to 
regulate tribal affairs and limit or expand tribal sovereignty through the 
Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Treaty Clause, 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.”20 Importantly, the court noted that in federal legislation 
mandating certain procedural safeguards in tribal courts, Congress only 
provided for a right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants for 
prosecutions that could result in imprisonment of more than one year.21 
Cavanaugh, however, was convicted of misdemeanors.22 The Court 
concluded that “Indian defendants in tribal court have no [c]onstitutional or 
statutory right to appointed counsel unless sentenced to a term of 
incarceration greater than one year”23 and ultimately found that 
 
 15.  Id. at 677. 
 16.  Id. at 679. 
 17.  E.g., United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 997 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 603–04 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 18.  Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 593. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 595–96 (citing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004)). 
 21.  Id. at 596; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6), (b), (c)(2) (2012). 
 22.  Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 593. 
 23.  Id. at 596. 
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Cavanaugh’s conviction did not violate the Constitution.24 Even though the 
prior convictions would have been invalid had they been obtained in state or 
federal courts, the Eighth Circuit determined they could still be used to 
prove the section 117 violation.25 Respecting Congress’s power to regulate 
tribal affairs and recognizing the sovereignty of the tribes to administer 
justice, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. 
III. Federal Legislation and Tribal Court Rules Provide Ample Procedural 
Safeguards 
Congress has general powers to legislate with respect to Indian tribes26 
and has implemented laws addressing criminal procedure in Indian courts. 
Although there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel in tribal 
courts—Congress, through the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”)—
provided numerous procedural safeguards to defendants in tribal court 
cases.27 Among other protections, the Act shields defendants against self-
incrimination, unreasonable searches and seizures, and double jeopardy; 
provides for a trial by jury upon request; and offers a right to counsel at the 
defendant’s expense. Defendants may also confront unfavorable witnesses 
and have access to favorable witnesses.28 As the Supreme Court noted in 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, Congress selectively incorporated and 
modified the “safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, 
cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments” when it implemented 
the Indian Civil Rights Act.29 
Tribal courts, including the courts of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe that 
convicted Bryant, must follow the procedures outlined in the ICRA. 
Moreover, the Northern Cheyenne courts have their own code of criminal 
procedure.30 The Tribal Code of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, Title 
V, Rules of Criminal Procedure gives criminal defendants a number of 
rights, including: the right to be present throughout the proceeding and 
defend himself in person, by lay counsel or professional attorney at his own 
expense; the right to meet witnesses face to face; the right to a speedy public 
 
 24.  Id. at 604–05. 
 25.  Id. at 604. 
 26.  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
 27.  25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
 28.  Id. at § 1302(a). 
 29.  436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978). 
 30.  Tribal Code of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, Title V: Rules of Criminal 
Procedure Code (1987) (amended 2008), 
http://indianlaw.mt.gov/content/northerncheyenne/codes/tribal_code.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8PP8-D6DJ]. 
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trial by an impartial jury if a prison sentence is possible; the right to testify; 
the right not to testify; and the right to appeal.31 The Rules of Criminal 
Procedure Code also addresses arrest and search and seizure procedures 
and32 rules for discovery, motion practice,33 pre-trial proceedings, and trial.34 
Tribal court convictions result from fair and reliable proceedings; 
Congress and tribes have guaranteed criminal defendants in tribal courts the 
right to due process. Federal courts should recognize the legitimacy of these 
convictions and allow prosecutors to use them as the bases for federal 
charges. 
IV. Congress Explicitly Recognized Tribal Court Convictions in Section 117 
All federal courts, including the Supreme Court, should defer to 
Congress’s intentional decision not to require a right to counsel in all tribal 
court proceedings. Congress enjoys broad authority over Indian affairs35 and 
a “fundamental commitment of Indian law is judicial respect for Congress’s 
primary role in defining the contours of tribal sovereignty.”36 Congress 
enacted section 117 pursuant to its authority over Indian affairs. 
Significantly, Congress did not impose a right-to-counsel requirement in 
order for a tribal court conviction to qualify as a predicate offense under the 
statute.37 
Nor has Congress granted criminal defendants in Indian courts a right 
to counsel in all cases. Since the ICRA grants criminal defendants a qualified 
right to counsel,38 it stands to reason that Congress considered and rejected 
granting an unqualified, mandatory right to counsel to defendants in tribal 
courts when it passed ICRA. Further, when Congress amended the ICRA 
with the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, it did not add a right to counsel 
in all tribal cases.39 Instead, the Tribal Law and Order Act provides a right to 
counsel only in cases where a tribe imposes a term of imprisonment of more 
 
 31.  Id. at 171–176. 
 32.  Id. at 17–18. 
 33.  Id. at 25–26. 
 34.  Id. at 13–25. 
 35.  See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648 (1977). 
 36.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2039 (2014) (citing Kiowa 
Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758–60 (1998)); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (“[A] proper respect . . . for the plenary authority of Congress 
in this area cautions that [the courts] tread lightly.”). 
 37.  18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012). 
 38.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 39.  Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2258, 2279–
82 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)–(b) (2012)). 
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than one year on a criminal defendant.40 For those defendants facing terms 
of imprisonment of less than one year, however, Congress did not extend 
any right to counsel. Congress has had ample opportunity to reflect on the 
right to an attorney in tribal court proceedings. Nonetheless, as part of its 
plenary authority over Indian matters, Congress has purposefully and 
thoughtfully chosen not to require a right to counsel. 
The Ninth Circuit suggested its decision in Bryant was “consistent with 
Congress’s dual interest in respecting tribal courts and ensuring due process 
for tribal court defendants.”41 But Congress has already explicitly outlined 
procedural protections for defendants in criminal courts and has chosen not 
to include a right to counsel in all cases.42 The Ninth Circuit should not be 
permitted to impinge on Congress’s authority by rejecting the established 
criminal procedures in tribal courts. 
V. Federal Courts Rely on Foreign Court Convictions That Would Violate 
the U.S. Constitution if Obtained in U.S. Courts 
The problematic nature of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bryant is 
brought into sharper relief when compared to prosecutors’ regular use of 
foreign convictions. Federal courts “have repeatedly recognized foreign 
convictions and accepted evidence obtained overseas by foreign law 
enforcement through means that deviate from . . . constitutional 
protections.”43 
Federal courts, for instance, have allowed the introduction of evidence 
of prior convictions that were obtained in courts sitting without juries. In 
United States v. Wilson, the Fourth Circuit determined a conviction in 
Germany was admissible because that defendant did not show “that the 
German legal system lacks the procedural protections necessary for 
fundamental fairness.”44 The court concluded the conviction obtained in a 
West German court without a jury could be used to impeach the defendant’s 
credibility.45 The Third Circuit has similarly held that the admission into 
evidence of a non-jury criminal conviction from the Philippines did not 
violate due process.46 Courts have also permitted statements made to foreign 
 
 40.  § 234, 124 Stat. 2258 at 2280. 
 41.  United States v. Bryant, 792 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 
690 (2015) (denying reh’g en banc to United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 42.  25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1302, 1304 (2012). 
 43.  United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 44.  556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir. 1977). 
 45.  See Wilson, 556 F.2d at 1178. 
 46.  United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 165–66, 172 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
June 2016] Trusting Tribal Courts 161 
law enforcement to be used at trial in the United States even though Miranda 
warnings were not given.47 
The Ninth Circuit has even permitted the use of evidence obtained by 
foreign law enforcement where the searches and seizures that produced the 
evidence would have violated the Fourth Amendment if they had been 
performed by agents of the United States. In United States v. Rose, a 
Canadian officer searched the appellant’s luggage in the course of a routine 
U.S. Customs stop and found illegal drugs.48 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
trial court had not erred in permitting introduction of the evidence, noting 
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to foreign 
searches by foreign officials in enforcement of foreign law, even if those from 
whom evidence is seized are American citizens.”49 
Finally, federal courts regularly use foreign convictions to make 
sentencing determinations. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
foreign convictions are not counted in a defendant’s criminal history score. 
Nevertheless, they may be considered when departing from the otherwise 
mandated range of punishment.50 The guidelines mandate that “[i]f reliable 
information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category 
substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal 
history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an 
upward departure may be warranted.”51 This “reliable information” includes 
“sentences for foreign and tribal offenses.”52 The Ninth Circuit has used such 
foreign convictions to justify upward departures from the federal sentencing 
guidelines.53 
Federal courts readily rely on evidence and convictions that would have 
violated a defendant’s constitutional rights had they been obtained in the 
United States. Yet, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the indictment against 
 
 47.  United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Welch, 
455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(per curiam); see United States v. Conway, No. 93-8124, 1995 WL 339403, at *3 (10th Cir. June 
8, 1995); United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 588 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum). 
 48.  570 F.2d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 49.  Id. at 1361; see also United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 455–56 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(“[T]he general rule is that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to arrests and searches 
made by foreign authorities in their own country and in enforcement of foreign law.”). 
 50.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(h) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). 
 51.  Id. § 4A1.3(a)(1). 
 52.  Id. § 4A1.3(a)(2)(A). 
 53.  E.g., United States v. Spencer, No. 94-10266, 1995 WL 40320, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 
1995) (upholding upward departure from sentencing guidelines for a charge of interstate 
transportation of stolen goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 based on defendant’s twenty-six prior 
convictions in England for “theft and theft-related offenses”). 
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Bryant because the tribal court convictions did not comport with the Sixth 
Amendment. The decision in U.S. v. Bryant reveals a mistaken distrust of 
convictions obtained in tribal courts that does not extend to the operations 
of foreign courts and law enforcement, even though tribal courts (and 
Congress) provide criminal defendants myriad procedural safeguards. 
VI. Convictions, Immigration Laws, and Congress 
In immigration cases, courts have been similarly willing to consider 
foreign judgments. Generally speaking, “[u]nless Congress intended the 
ground of inadmissibility to apply only to U.S. convictions, a conviction by a 
foreign country may bring about the same immigration consequences as a 
conviction inside the U.S. . . . If there is a conviction, the U.S. courts will not 
look behind the conviction to see if the proceedings violated U.S. 
constitutional guarantees.”54 
In Brice v. Pickett, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Congress 
intended for a statute to apply to foreign convictions obtained against a 
defendant.55 The defendant in Brice appealed an order of the district court 
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.56 Brice had been detained by 
the immigration authorities following a hearing in which he was “found 
deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11), which provides, in part, that an 
alien may be deported who ‘at any time has been convicted of a violation 
of . . . any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of . . . marijuana.’ 
“57 At the hearing, Brice had admitted that he was an alien and that a 
Japanese court convicted him, upon a guilty plea, of unlawful possession of 
marijuana.58 The district court had determined the “evidence supporting the 
finding of deportability to be clear, convincing and unequivocal.”59 
On appeal, Brice argued that Congress did not intend 8 U.S.C. § 
1251(a)(11) to apply to foreign convictions.60 The Ninth Circuit disagreed 
and noted “[t]he wording of that statute . . . strongly indicates that Congress 
did intend to include foreign convictions. A plain reading of ‘any law or 
regulation’ would include foreign laws or regulations.”61 The Ninth Circuit 
 
 54.  DANIEL LEVY & CHARLES ROTH, NATIONAL LAWYERS’ GUILD, NATIONAL 
IMMIGRATION PROJECT, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK § 8:3 (2015–
2016 ed. 2015). 
 55.  515 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 56.  Id. at 153. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 153–54. 
 61.  Id. at 154. 
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could have questioned the validity and reliability of the foreign conviction. 
Instead, the court simply looked at Congress’s decision to include foreign 
convictions in the statute and determined the statute was applicable to 
foreign convictions. 
In contrast, despite the clear Congressional intent to include “tribal 
courts” in section 117, the Ninth Circuit curiously refused to accept the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court convictions in U.S. v. Bryant. This 
unwillingness to recognize the validity of tribal court convictions as 
predicate offenses erroneously suggests criminal justice in other countries is 
more fair and reliable than the procedures in tribal courts. 
Conclusion 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to reject the tribal court convictions reveals 
an alarming distrust of tribal courts and suggests they are undependable and 
unfair. Since the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has treated 
Indian sovereigns as “distinct, independent political communities” deserving 
respect.62 If federal courts are willing to use foreign evidence and 
convictions, tribal courts should be afforded the same deference, particularly 
considering Congress and the tribes have already provided robust 
procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court should overturn the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling in U.S. v. Bryant. To hold otherwise would undermine the 
integrity of the tribal courts and threaten the rights of Native Americans to 
administer justice as a sovereign community. 
 
 
 62.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832), abrogated by, Utah & N. Ry. 
Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885). 
